Contemporary-Humanism, Author at Contemporary Humanism

INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE ORIENTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CARE (Cecilia Sabato)

Dialogue is the way that mature humanity uses as a tool to solve its problems in almost all areas.

In order not to be misleading, dialogue must have its own rules; actually, it is necessary that the parties assume mutual respect for human dignity, freedom of expression, and respect for the environment as a fundamental criterion.

In this sense, interreligious dialogue is important because it is based on intentions of respect for the whole of creation.

Interreligious dialogue is part of the evangelizing mission of the Church and is intended as a method and means for mutual knowledge and enrichment. The real common element of religions is not the mystical experience but the salvific function. Hence the need for dialogue in order to know and welcome the salvific values that emerge in the various religious experiences.

However, Carlo Molari, theologist of interreligious dialogue, recommends to overcome the possible temptation to elaborate a theology of religions before engaging in dialogue within them. On the other hand, such a dialogue always requires a theology, which disposes to change and solicits conversion. The commitment to dialogue with other religions already implies in itself that the Church is exposed to challenges.

I remind the periodic interreligious meeting for peace which has been being held in Assisi since 1986, promoted by Pope John Paul II, as a clear manifestation of a trend in the Catholic Church of openness towards interreligious dialogue for peace and harmony among religions.

I shortly recall the Buddhist, Christian-Jewish and Islamic concepts of creation and environment and the relationship between human being and nature, being the care of the environment a common ground among those religions.

Buddhism is a didactic that deals with learning the way that leads to liberation from suffering. Buddhism represents the efforts of the whole of humanity to follow the original teaching regarding the path of liberation.

We can summarize that teaching in the following steps:

1) Do no harm;

2) Be benevolent, welcoming towards all beings;

3) Meditate deeply to get to know the depths of your heart;

4) Do not make your desire the yardstick of your choices, placing instead at the first place the adherence to the path of liberation from suffering, from human misery, which is a way of union with all human beings, with all creation.

In Buddhism, each component of the environment in which we live is called « the life I live ». Therefore, any behavior that is an aggression towards the environment, or towards my life understood in a broader sense, is an inconceivable behavior because it is equivalent to an action of self-harm from the point of view of the construction of the quality of life and, at the same time, an aggression against all other beings.

Responsibility towards creation is also fundamental within the Christian-Jewish vision of life; actually, at the second chapter of the book of Genesis we read: « The Lord God took man and put him in the garden of Eden to keep and cultivate it » (Gen 2:15). These two verbs are very significant, to solemnly codify the duty of safeguarding creation, providing a real biblical foundation of ecology and ecological culture and behavior. The story of creation continues with the breaking of harmony within man, woman and God relationship which also leads to disharmony between human beings and nature.

Christianity takes up and strengthens the messianic hope of either anthropological and ecological restoration, as a « new beginning » within human history via the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, called the « new Adam », precisely to indicate all the innovative power of His presence in history, capable of a re-foundation of the history on Earth, including a consequent ecological restoration.

Recently, Pope Francis has drawn two encyclicals that actualize the message of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ in the sense just illustrated.

In the vision of Islam, God has given full trust to the human being by assigning the mission of taking care of humanity as well as of other creatures.

Islamic law includes the rules basing the relationship between human beings and the environment among the fundamental rights and duties. It obliges to save the environment and share it with others, as well as it guarantees everyone the right to stay in a clean and beautiful area where life might be possible in peace and dignity. This is a common feature with the biblical Old Testament and therefore with the Christian-Jewish vision.

In such a context, the Catholic Universities, as repositories of culture embedded in a religious background, may play a critical role in growing a more responsible attitude and ecological expertise for a healthier planet and more peaceful and fairer society. Interreligious dialogue should be a focus for its potential role in deepening, extending and strengthening the impact on the global society.

Bibliographic References

Molari C., Teologia del pluralismo religioso, Pazzini Editore, Ravenna 2013

Pope Francis, Laudato Si’(encyclical), 2015

Pope Francis, Fratelli Tutti (encyclical), 2020

Sacred text Buddism: Buddhist canon
Sacred text Judaism: Hebrew Bible

Sacred text Christianity: Christian Bible

Sacred text Islam: Quran

Cecilia Sabato is a PhD Student in Contemporary Humanism at Lumsa University (curriculum Education).

Paper presented at the Conference « Dialogo a tutto campo » organised by the Catholic Forum Roma.

Fraternity and Supererogation (Stefano Biancu)

Pope Francis’ encyclical “Fratelli tutti” proposes the so-called parable of the Good Samaritan[1] as the paradigm of a fraternity understood as a social friendship (see Fratelli tutti, n. 56-86). This proposal is of interest to the moral philosopher for at least a couple of reasons.

The first reason is that the Samaritan’s attitude is presented as a moral example which is not only valid for Christians, but for everyone, regardless of their religious beliefs. The second reason is that that attitude is considered valid, not only in the private sphere of interpersonal relationships, but also as a paradigm of a new form of citizenship.

These statements are not obvious at all. The Samaritan’s attitude is traditionally considered the emblem of “supererogation”. This is a technical term which indicates those actions and attitudes which, while being morally good, are however not strictly required. This area of actions and attitudes has long been considered beyond ethics and beyond the call of duty which is typical of modern citizenship.

The notion of Supererogation

The history of the concept of supererogation[2] has its origins precisely in the parable of the Good Samaritan and, in particular, in the Vulgate, the Latin translation of the Christian Bible dating back to the 4^th century. In the instructions the Samaritan gives the innkeeper so that he takes care, in his absence, of the unfortunate pilgrim, the Vulgata reads: “Curam illius habe, et, quodcumque supererogaveris, ego, cum rediero, reddam tibi” (Lk 10:35). The Latin verb « supererogaveris” is translated, in the current versions of the biblical text, by the periphrasis « whatever more you spend ». Supererogation has therefore to do with a “surplus” and, in particular, with an additional cost, an extra expense. This is why the attitude of the Samaritan has traditionally become the emblem of supererogation.

Starting from the Gospel, the Fathers of the Church have introduced the term into the technical language of theology, referring it to actions recommended by spiritual tradition, but contrary to natural inclinations, such as fast and chastity.[3] But it is only with Thomas Aquinas that the term became relevant.[4] According to Aquinas, a good moral action can be either commanded or advised. That is, it can be the object of either an obligation (the sphere of « praecepta ») or a recommendation (the sphere of « consilia », such as chastity, poverty, obedience). This second category includes supererogatory actions, i.e. actions which, while being morally positive, are beyond the call of duty. According to Aquinas, counsels are morally superior to commandments. If the latter concern what is good, the former concern a better good. Aquinas’ perspective on supererogation became canonical, remaining substantially unchanged for a few centuries, at least until Luther and the other Reformers.[5] In their eyes, supererogatory actions took the shape of human claims to obtain salvation thanks to one’s own merits.

In the following centuries, the notion of supererogation lost its relevance and centrality, both in theology and philosophy, at least until 1958, when the British philosopher James Urmson published his short essay Saints and Heroes.[6] Urmson’s thesis goes as follows: moral philosophy has traditionally disregarded two types of actions, the saintly and the heroic ones. Such actions would not fall in the commonly accepted classification, according to which moral actions would be divided into (1) morally right obligatory actions, (2) morally wrong prohibited actions, (3) morally neutral permitted actions. Saintly and heroic actions do not fit in this classification as long as they are morally good actions which are not obligatory, not due nor demandable. More precisely, although they may be perceived as mandatory from a first person perspective (i.e. by the subject at the moment of deliberation), they are not so from a third person perspective (i.e. from the point of view of an external observer). According to Urmson, compared to the « basic moral duties », those actions would represent « the higher flights of morality ». Following Urmson’s pioneering article, a huge debate has opened up in Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy about the concept of supererogation: about its definition, about the taxonomy of supererogatory actions and attitudes, about the paradoxes inherent in the notion.[7]

What is interesting for us is that the encyclical “Fratelli tutti” places supererogatory attitudes and acts – of which the Good Samaritan is a moral example – as a paradigm not only of ethics, but of a new form of citizenship. What can the moral philosopher say about this claim?

Rethinking the notion of duty

As I have tried to show elsewhere,[8] taking the notion of supererogation seriously requires to rethink the notion of duty. In particular, I think it is necessary to distinguish at least three different levels of the experience of duty.

A first experience of duty is situated at a legal level: my duty corresponds either to the respect of the right of another person or to what is established by a law. This kind of duty is intended to protect freedom and human rights, which are supposed to be an original human feature, as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights puts it, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (article 1). By setting boundaries and limitations, legal duties aim at protecting everybody’s original freedom and rights.

A second experience of duty is situated at an ethical level. A form of responsibility comes up at each encounter between humans. Not only I am responsible for my own actions (which I might be asked to justify), but I am someway responsible for the other’s life and destiny.[9] An implicit call for love is present in each human encounter and I have to respond as suitably as possible to this call.

A third experience of duty is situated at an anthropological level. At this level, the idea according to which all human beings are born free is an abstraction.[10] Humans are born able to be free, but they actually need to become free. Freedom has its own genealogy and conditions, and love is one of these conditions. Not only I need to be free in order to love someone, but I also need to receive and give love in order to become free. Only if I act out of love – love for myself and for others – I can truly be free.

Supererogation is beyond the call of duty at a legal level, i.e. beyond what the moral agent might be required to do by either a law or the respect of a third person’s rights. At this level, no one has the right to bother me by asking me to love them (i.e. to forgive, to be generous, to give my life for someone…).

But supererogation is not beyond the call of duty at an ethical level: I have to respond as suitably as I can to the call for love of my neighbour, since both their and my destiny depends on my response. This is what Jaspers called a “metaphysical” responsibility, based on an original solidarity among humans.[11]

Supererogation is not beyond the call of duty on an anthropological level either. At this level, duty is what I actually need in order to become free, to actually become a subject. Something is due to the extent that it is a condition of my subjectivity and liberty. I become subject by freely and suitably responding to someone who in some way bothers me by asking me for love.

According to a very traditional view, supererogation is beyond the call of duty and (therefore) beyond ethics. The implicit presupposition of this view is that duty has in itself a legal shape: it corresponds to the respect of a third person’s right or to what is established by a law. But we need to enlarge our understanding of duty, by seeing it also as a necessary condition of possibility (of freedom, of subjectivity, of humanity…). Being one of these conditions of possibility, supererogation exceeds the mere legal understanding of duty, but not duty itself. It therefore becomes in all respects, an ethical phenomenon.

In other words: supererogation can be considered as a « maximum » if compared to the « minimum » which cannot and must not be missing – i.e. the area of what is demanded either by a law or by the respect of a third person’s rights. Since it is one of the conditions of freedom and subjectivity, this “maximum” is nevertheless someway “necessary” – the liberal State needs citizens who are truly free human subjects.

By contributing to create truly human and free subjects, the supererogatory attitude of the Good Samaritan – a fraternity understood as a social friendship – fulfils those premises on which the liberal State lives without being able to guarantee them by itself.[12] With good reason, it can be thus considered an ethical phenomenon and the core of a new form of citizenship.

[1] Lk 10:25-37.

[2] See. D. Heyd, Supererogation. Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982, part 1 (The view of some major ethical theories); J. Janiaud, Au-delà du devoir. L’acte surérogatoire, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes 2007, ch. III (Petit parcours historique).

[3] See. D. Dentsoras, The Birth of Supererogation, «Epoché. A Journal for the History of Philosophy», Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 351-372.

[4] See. D. Witschen, Zur Bestimmung supererogatorischer Handlungen: der Beitrag des Thomas von Aquin, «Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie», 1-3, 51 (2004), pp. 27-40.

[5] See M. Konrad, Precetti e consigli: studi sull’etica di san Tommaso d’Aquino a confronto con Lutero e Kant, Lateran University Press, Roma 2005, pp. 119-140.

[6] See J.O. Urmson, Saints and Heroes (1958), in J. Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1969, pp. 60-73.

[7] See A. Archer, Supererogation, «Philosophy Compass», Vol. 13, Issue 3 (March 2018); C. Cowley, Introduction: The Agents, Acts and Attitudes of Supererogation, in Id. (ed), Supererogation, (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Volume 77 – October 2015), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, pp. 1-23; D. Heyd, Supererogation, in E.N. Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2016 Edition (https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/supererogation).

[8] See S. Biancu, Il massimo necessario. L’etica alla prova dell’amore, Mimesis, Milano 2020; Id., Héros et saints : un autre (trans)humanisme, «Transversalités», 153, 2020, pp. 25-39.

[9] See E. Levinas, Totalité et Infini, Nijhoff, La Haye 1961; B. Waldenfelds, Topographie des Fremden. Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden 1, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1997; Id., Bruchlinien der Erfahrung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2002.

[10] See J.-M. Ferry, Les Grammaires de l’intelligence, Cerf, Paris, 2004, p. 201.

[11] See K. Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Frage, Artemis, Zürich 1946, p. 11.

[12] See E.-W. Böckenförde, Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation [1967], in Id., Recht, Staat, Freiheit. Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, Staatstheorie und Verfassungsgeschichte, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2006, pp. 92-114: 112 («Der freiheitliche, säkularisierte Staat lebt von Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantieren kann»).

Originally published on Educa. International Catholic Journal of Education. Download here this article.

A Comment on « Fratelli tutti » 13-14 (Giuseppe Tognon)

The Encyclical Fratelli tutti is rich in suggestions. The text works on a “rhizomatic” basis, that corresponds to its inspiring principles, i.e. fraternity and social friendship. The ultimate goal of these principles is extending to all human beings the grace of a bond that projects the light of Salvation on human history. Pope Francis tells us that it’s only by going beyond genos and blood ties that we will be able to open doors to the Christian revolution. Doors will also open up to a form of paternity and maternity that engages all men of good will in the quest for justice and in the safeguard of creation. Blood and cultural ties are just the tools through which individuals and groups contribute to the species survival. Nonetheless, they do not exhaust the human “generating power” and, above all, they can’t be put forward as the bedrock of the Church, a spiritual community that lives inside history, precisely to guide it and also to witness that history itself will be ultimately overpassed.

Nevertheless, fraternity can be the new world frontier only if we start from the awareness that humanity is going through some hard times and if we are able to compare present and past. It is clear that every age had their difficulties. But the current period is characterized exactly by the refusal to look at models from the past, as it was always done before, for thousands of years. Our age rejects what a great Catholic historian, Henri-Irenée Marrou, called the “sadness” of the job of the historian, facing all the time human weaknesses and miseries. Globalization has masked identities that close off to defend what they are without understanding how and why they are that way. It makes many peoples captive of dictators and adventurers. It generates some absurd forms of inequality and injustice.

Against a naive use of the idea of fraternity, typical of simplistic revolutionary ideologies; and against an unscrupulous, phony use of democracy, the fraternity the Encyclical puts forth is founded on the historical consciousness that, not only religions, but also humanity itself, are at risk. Besides, those who seek fraternity are exactly the people who are not “naturally” siblings and know they are not. So, fraternity is a civil virtue that requires maturity and awareness, especially from those who have the possibility to judge and act without depending on despair. The practice of fraternity is a paramount challenge for the rich ones and the wise ones. A strong historical consciousness of personal and collective experience is the indispensable premise of a staunch practice of fraternity. Historical knowledge of the past teaches us that fraternity is always difficult, all the more so if we want to extend it to humankind. But historical consciousness suggests to us that the past will not influence the future, unless we allow it to last. Past and future are projections of men on time. They exist because they are filled with meanings that men share. Historians document the past and build up historical knowledge, but historical knowledge rises when people head to the future in light of a faith.

Originally published on Educa. International Catholic Journal of Education. Read here the rest of this article.

Le séminaire annuel de 2021

Fraternité

L’amitié sociale au temps de la distanciation sociale

Fraternity

Social Friendship during the Time of Social Distancing

6-10 septembre 2021

6 septembre : Luca VALERA (PUC), Distance and Presence in a Technological Environment
7 septembre : Matteo RIZZOLLI (Università Lumsa), Covid-19 and Social Preferences
8 septembre : Emmanuel FALQUE (ICP), Fraternity and Solitude
9 septembre : Stephanie COLLINS (ACU), Loneliness and Obligation
10 septembre : Alexandre PALMA (UCP), Humanity and Spatiality

Téléchargez le programme complet .

2021 Annual Seminar – Matteo Rizzoli and Stefano Biancu

2021 Annual Seminar

Fraternité – L’amitié sociale au temps de la distanciation sociale

Fraternity

Social Friendship during the Time of Social Distancing

6-10 septembre 2021

6 septembre : Luca VALERA (PUC), Distance and Presence in a Technological Environment
7 septembre : Matteo RIZZOLLI (Università Lumsa), Covid-19 and Social Preferences
8 septembre : Emmanuel FALQUE (ICP), Fraternity and Solitude
9 septembre : Stephanie COLLINS (ACU), Loneliness and Obligation
10 septembre : Alexandre PALMA (UCP), Humanity and Spatiality

Téléchargez le programme complet .

2021 Séminaire annuel en ligne

Fraternity

Social Friendship during the Time of Social Distancing

September 6th-10th, 2021

7am (Santiago de Chile) – 12 pm (Lisbon) – 1pm (Rome/Paris) – 9 pm (Melbourne)

youtube.com/user/lumsaorienta

Du lundi 6 au vendredi 10 septembre 2021 se tiendra le séminaire de recherche annuel du programme de doctorat international en Humanisme contemporain. Le séminaire a pour thème :« Fraternity. Social Friendship during the Time of Social Distancing». Cinq grands enseignants-chercheurs des cinq universités partenaires du programme donneront une conférence chaque jour à 13h sur YouTube, à l’adresse youtube.com/user/lumsaorienta.

6 septembre : Luca VALERA (PUC), Distance and Presence in a Technological Environment
7 septembre : Luigino BRUNI (Universita Lumsa), The Wounded Fraternity: the Bible’s Lessonfor Economics
8 septembre : Emmanuel FALQUE (ICP), Fraternity and Solitude
9 septembre : Stephanie COLLINS (ACU), Loneliness and Obligation
10 septembre : Alexandra PALMA (UCP), Humanity and Spatiality

The program.

Fundamental Freedoms and the Problem of Freedom (Stefano Biancu)

For more than a year now, we have been witnessing the biggest limitation of fundamental freedoms since the Second World War, at least in Europe and in many democratic countries. Limitations on social life, on traveling, on worship have become daily life for us. An unprecedented limitation of freedoms (in the plural) urges us to question ourselves about the nature of freedom (in the singular): what does it mean to be free?

The Ideal and the Concept of Freedom

When you lose something, you often learn the hard way how important it was what you had taken for granted. Today, in the midst of a long health emergency, being confined and limited in many ways, we perceive how essential freedom is. At the same time, we find it hard to say what is this freedom that we miss so much. The ideal of freedom is clear: we all agree on how important freedom is. But the concept of freedom is complex and someway mysterious: it is not easy to say what freedom really is.

Freedom is certainly a set of simple things: gathering with family and friends, traveling, going to the cinema or to an art exhibition, having a coffee sitting at a bar table, eating a pizza with friends, moving around, taking a walk under the stars in the middle of the night, not being forced to wear a mask. We understand all this very well: it is what we miss. But we are aware that freedom is not just that.

To try to understand what freedom is, let’s start with a distinction that has become a classic: the distinction between negative and positive freedom. It is a distinction already proposed by Immanuel Kant,[1] but which has become a classic after the famous inaugural lecture on “Two Concepts of Liberty” that sir Isaiah Berlin gave at Oxford University in 1958.[2]

Negative and Positive Freedom

Negative freedom is the mere absence of external limits or interference. It is therefore a freedom that has to do with society and which concerns the action of the agent. It corresponds to what is lawful and allowed. Negative freedom – to which Berlin gives a preference in the political sphere – can be easily understood in the plural (in the sense of the fundamental freedoms). As the absence of external constraints, negative freedom is now vastly more limited than it was before the pandemic.

Instead, positive freedom can be understood in terms of self-control and self-determination. It concerns the will of the agent and it corresponds to autonomy, in the sense of the power of the subject to give norms to themselves.

Positive freedom is complex. It is certainly to be understood as free will, that is, the ability to choose between different options. In this sense, it is an innate capacity of the human being. This capacity is very much discussed today in the debate on determinism raised by the neurosciences. For now, there is no philosophical or scientific evidence that allows us to deny this fundamental human ability. In the absence of this evidence, I firmly believe that we must assume this capacity exists. Especially in that the possibility of moral, legal and political responsibility is based on this same capacity.

Love and then do what you want

But positive freedom is not just free will, that is, the formal and innate possibility of choosing between different options, of doing what you want. Positive freedom is also an ability of autonomy which develops over time. It is not the mere possibility for the agent to do what they want, but it is the ability for the subject to truly want to do what they do, to fully own their actions. In this sense, freedom is being one with yourself, fulfilling your own humanity.

Let’s think about Saint Augustine’s iconic formulation of freedom – “Dilige et quod vis fac” (Love and then do what you want).[3] Only superficially freedom is the empty possibility of loving or not loving (or even hating).

Only if you act motivated by love, you are truly free. When you act out of fear, resentment, envy, vice, you may act within a space of non-constraint and free choice between different options, but you don’t feel like you are really free, you don’t feel like you are one with yourself. You don’t feel like you really want to do what you do. You are truly free only if you act motivated by love – love for yourself and love for your neighbour.

The first article of 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. This statement is to be understood as a regulative ideal and not as a matter of fact.[4] It is not true at all the human beings are born free and equal.

From a legal and political point of view, freedom must be understood as an innate right to be protected. Negative freedom must protect the innate free will of the human being. Human beings are born capable of free will, but freedom understood as being one with yourself is an achievement for them. Freedom is also a path to take.

Neoliberal Freedom

Today we are facing a neoliberal and very pervasive idea of freedom. A freedom which presents itself as the opposite of constraint, but which actually generates constraint itself. In 2014 Korean philosopher based in Germany Byung-Chul Han published his book “Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power”.[5] In this book, Byung-Chul Han states that the neoliberal subject sees themselves as a project which is free from obligations and constraints imposed by others.

Nevertheless, being in competition with all their fellow humans, this subject forces themselves to efficiency and ends up submitting to internal obligations and self-imposed constraints. Believing themselves to be free, the individual is in reality a servant who exploits themselves. As Byung-Chul Han points out, “Neoliberalism represents a highly efficient, indeed an intelligent, system for exploiting freedom”. “People who fail in the neoliberal achievement-society see themselves as a responsible for their lot and feel shame instead of questioning society or the system”.

With respect to the neoliberal project, it is evident that a purely negative freedom – which aims to limit as much as possible the external constraints of freedom – does not guarantee in itself the quality and the strength of freedom. Freedom is not only the possibility to do what you want. As Byung-Chul Han shows it, this kind of freedom can put the subject against themselves.

More deeply, freedom should be understood as the ability for the subject to want to do what they do, to be one with their own will and action. Freedom is the capacity for the subject to fully own themselves, and therefore to completely realize themselves. Only this way we will all be equal because we will all be enabled to completely fulfil our own humanity. Only love – love for ourselves and love for our neighbours – allows us to reach our humanity and autonomy.

This means that we should teach our children how to be truly free, how to be happy, not how to be successful.

Democracy and Freedom

Even on a political level, freedom cannot be understood as mere indifference, as mere possibility to think or not to think. Democracy not only guarantees freedom of action and thought, but presupposes and needs citizens that are truly capable of free action and thought. The democratic form of sovereignty can only be achieved if citizens are fully in control of themselves, of their wishes and needs – if they are truly free.[6]

A people incapable of controlling their wishes and needs produces a democracy of slaves. Otherwise, the free and active democratic participation is reduced to a list of complaints. The citizen is transformed into a passive consumer.[7]

In these times, when negative freedom is much more limited than it used to be before the pandemic, we can take the opportunity to work towards the development of a more positive freedom. A kind of freedom which is the ability for the subject to truly become themselves, to be one with themselves. A kind of freedom which is not mere indifference, not a mere possibility either to love or not to love, either to think or not to think.

Negative freedom is a precondition of love, but love is a precondition of positive freedom. “Love and then do what you want”.

References

Biancu (2020), Il massimo necessario. L’etica alla prova dell’amore, Mimesis, Milano 2020

Biancu (2021a), “Libertà”, in Dizionarietto di politica. Le nuove parole, Morcelliana, Brescia 2021

Biancu (2021b), “Libertà, invenzione (e manutenzione) di un concetto”, Munera. Rivista europea di cultura, 2/2021

[1] See Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785).

[2] See I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (1958), in Id., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, London 1967, n. ed. in Liberty, H. Hardy (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002; I. Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2019 Ed., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/liberty-positive-negative/.

[3] See Epistolam Joannis ad Parthos, tractatus 7, sect. 8; PL 35, 2033.

[4] See J.-M. Ferry, Les Grammaires de l’intelligence, Cerf, Paris 2004, p. 201.

[5] See B.-C. Han, Psychopolitik. Neoliberalismus und die neuen Machttechniken, S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt 2014.

[6] See E.-W. Böckenförde, Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation (1967), in Id., Recht, Staat, Freiheit. Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie, Staatstheorie und Verfassungsgeschichte, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2006, pp. 92-114.

[7] See B.-C. Han, Psychopolitik. Neoliberalismus und die neuen Machttechniken, S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt 2014.

(Presentation at the SIIAEC online Conference 2021 on “Ethical Action: COVID Affecting Human Rights and Democracy”, April 30 – May 1, 2021)

L’autre humanisme de la phénoménologie (Jérôme de Gramont)

Jérôme de Gramont, professeur de philosophie à l’Institut Catholique de Paris, donne un séminaire sur « L’autre humanisme de la phénoménologie – Sur quelques pages d’Emmanuel Lévinas ».

Vulnerabilité et responsabilité (Stefano Biancu)

Je suis professeur : je travaille avec des paroles. Je sais comment remplir de paroles toute espèce d’espace ou de temps. Je sais comment captiver l’attention d’un auditoire avec une parole amusante ou une autre émouvante. Je sais comment m’en tirer avec élégance lorsqu’on n’a pas réponse à toutes les demandes. Cela, je l’ai appris, ce sont les ficelles du métier.

Mais voilà que maintenant je n’ai plus de paroles. Les paroles dont je disposais ne suffisent pas pour dire ce à quoi j’assiste, ce que nous sommes en train de vivre. Je voudrais bien échapper à tout cela, mais je ne sais où aller, car nous sommes tous dans le même bateau : le voisin de la porte à côté, l’éloigné qui habite dans l’autre hémisphère.

La seule parole qui me soit restée est « pourquoi ? ». Pourquoi tout cela ? Pourquoi dans ces proportions ? A cette demande, je n’ai pas de réponse, et, cette fois, je ne peux pas m’en tirer avec élégance.

A mes étudiants j’explique qu’une action n’est pas un « simple fait » : elle suppose un agent libre et responsable, quelqu’un à qui je puisse demander de rendre compte de son agir, de le justifier, de le rendre juste à mes yeux.

Mais aujourd’hui, il n’y a personne à qui nous puissions demander des comptes. Toutes les tentatives de trouver un responsable – quelqu’un qui puisse répondre de ce qui arrive – apparaissent vaines. Le virus n’est même pas un être vivant. Il tue et détruit sans même la motivation – discutable mais compréhensible – de devoir assurer sa propre subsistance. Mors tua, vita mea.

Des responsables, nous avons essayé d’en trouver : la pollution, certaines pratiques de zootechnie, les mensonges du gouvernement chinois, la désorganisation de notre pays, les coupures dans le budget de la santé, et jusqu’aux adeptes du jogging. Ne serait-ce pas eux les responsables de la catastrophe : si tu coures alors que les gens meurent, c’est toi qui dois être le coupable. Je le confesse : tant que cela a été possible, j’ai été l’un d’eux. Je courais pour vivre et je le faisais sans risquer la vie de personne, et je sais bien que ce n’est pas là qu’il faut chercher le responsable. Nous sommes devenus mauvais les uns à l’égard des autres dans notre recherche désespérée d’un responsable : trouvons-le et le problème sera réglé !

Voilà bien le drame : un responsable, cette fois-ci, il n’y en a pas. Il n’y a personne qui puisse répondre de tout cela. Certains choix – erronés ou en retard – ont pu aggraver la situation, ou ne pas limiter suffisamment les dégâts, mais un véritable responsable à qui demander des comptes de cette mort, de cette destruction, il n’y en a pas. Et dans cette absence de réponse, il n’y a plus de parole. Et pourtant nous avons besoin de paroles, autant que nous avons besoin de cet air que le virus soustrait à ceux qu’il frappe.

Les traitements cette fois-ci auront inévitablement de très lourds effets collatéraux. En sauvant des vies, nous en risquons d’autres. Le choix entre pandémie et famine est un dilemme indécidable comme l’est tout choix entre qui vit et qui meurt. Sur le moment, vaut le principe de se concentrer sur le péril le plus imminent, mais l’argument ne sera pas indéfiniment valide : rapidement la faim et la solitude pourraient bien tuer, autant que le virus. Nous ne savons pas quoi dire, tout est si incertain.

Tout ira bien, répétons-nous comme une mantra. Aujourd’hui pourtant, nous savons que tout n’ira pas bien, en tout cas pas pour tous. Le coût humain de cette mésaventure sera très élevé pour beaucoup, davantage encore pour certains. Ici encore, disparaît la parole « tout ira bien » à laquelle on s’agrippait, supprimée par une colonne de camions militaires remplie de cercueils.

Qui pourra nous redonner une parole au milieu de ce vide de réponses ? dans cette situation dans laquelle il semble que, quoi qu’on fasse, on se trompe ou du moins on ne résout rien ? Dans cette tragédie continue d’illusions au travers desquelles il devient chaque jour plus évident que tout, en fin de compte, ne sera pas allé bien ?

Aujourd’hui comme jamais, il devient clair que l’espérance n’est pas une passion, non plus qu’un sentiment. C’est le résultat d’une décision, d’un choix. Aujourd’hui, nous pouvons choisir l’espérance. En ce qui concerne ce que nous sommes en train de vivre, nous sommes plus vulnérables que responsables. Il y a davantage de choses qui échappent à notre contrôle que de choses sous contrôle. Et pourtant, il y a une chose dont nous sommes responsables : notre espérance.

L’espérance n’est pas l’illusion que le mal ne nous frappera pas, l’illusion de ne pas être vulnérables. C’est la confiance dans le fait que cet immense non-sens peut avoir un sens. Nous pourrons recommencer à avoir des paroles, mais de ce sens et de ces paroles, nous serons, nous, les responsables.

La condition sera de ne pas gâcher ce temps extrême de l’isolement, de la quarantaine. Il aura du sens si nous l’employons à travailler sur nous-mêmes, alors que la situation nous impose de faire face à la réalité que nous sommes nous-mêmes, sans les filtres sociaux. L’entrepreneur, l’ouvrier, le domestique, le modèle sont ici à la même enseigne : en face d’eux-mêmes. Ce temps aura du sens si nous l’employons à travailler sur nos relations humaines, maintenant que les sociales se sont espacées. Il aura du sens si chacun, à la mesure de ses possibilités, contribue à rêver un monde différent, à en faire le projet : une autre politique, une autre économie, une autre Europe et jusqu’à une autre éthique.

Une éthique qui devra être à la hauteur de ces êtres inséparablement vulnérables et responsables que le virus nous a fait découvrir en nous-mêmes. Une éthique pour des êtres qui n’ont pas tout sous contrôle mais qui doivent faire le bien qu’ils peuvent, bien au-delà de ce que peuvent exiger les droits d’un tiers ou les préceptes d’une loi.

Tout ce que naguère, nous considérions comme surérogatoire – c’est-à-dire bon mais non requis – est aujourd’hui devenu devoir quotidien, réponse nécessaire à la clameur des plus vulnérables, condition même pour vivre en hommes. Le commandement de l’amour – le surérogatoire par excellence – ce qu’on ne peut pas exiger de toi, depuis toujours considéré comme valide seulement pour des croyants, s’impose aujourd’hui comme le centre vivant de l’éthique. Sine amore non possumus.

L’heureuse fin ne sera peut-être pas celle que nous nous étions imaginée lorsque nous répétions que tout ira bien : nous sommes vulnérables. Mais une autre heureuse fin est encore possible, est dans notre possible, et de celle-là nous sommes responsables.

(Traduit de l’italien par Ghislain Lafont)